Ryan Burge is a political scientist, a leading analyst on religion and politics in the United States, and—until about six years ago, I think—an American Baptist pastor. He also writes an excellent Substack called Graphs About Religion. On Monday, he published a post titled 2024 Election Post-Mortem: Mainline Protestants and it became part of the discourse among my colleagues because the basic thrust of the data was surprising at best and disappointing at worst:
First, the last time a presidential election was close among mainline Protestant voters was 2008 (when it was 49% to John McCain and 51% to Barack Obama). Since then, Republican vote share among mainline Protestants has increased steadily, and in 2024, it went 58% to Donald Trump and 40% to Kamala Harris. Obviously, some mainline denomination lean more Republican than others. But even denominations that people often think of as very liberal—my own United Church of Christ included—have been trending in that direction. The United Church of Christ presidential vote was split 34-64 in 2008 (though Barack Obama was also a member of our denomination, so that may have had an effect) was was split 51-46 in 2024.
Second, on several key issues, mainline Protestants lean conservative. They lean less conservative than evangelical Protestants and Catholics, but majorities of mainline Protestants support banning gender transitions for minors (62% for mainline Protestants vs. 32% for all Democrats), requiring parental consent for pronoun changes for minors (66% vs. 31%), requiring age checks for porn (85% vs. 68%), and school vouchers (50% vs. 25%).
Third, the presidential vote share that goes to Republicans goes up as attendance goes up. Fifty-three percent of mainline Protestants who seldom attend worship services voted for Trump in 2024. For people who attend monthly, it was 56%. For people who attend weekly, it was 59%. And for people who attend more than once a week, it was 63%.
So, let’s talk about little bit about what’s going on here. Some of this is covered by Burge in his post, but there are two things that he didn’t talk about.
First, to start with something that Burge doesn’t write about, but that I wrote about in another post, 2024 was a weird election. As I wrote there, a lot of people who are not well-informed about politics and who do not vote often voted for Trump, there was a general vibecession, and there was a fierce global backlash against incumbents. Those facts don’t change the trend, nor do they change the impact that a Trump presidency is having on our country and the world, but they do mean that the 2024 election may not mean as much in the long run.
Second, to continue with another thing that Burge doesn’t write about, religion in general, Christianity in particular, and church attendance in even greater particularity, is coded as conservative. Political affiliation among people who think of themselves as having political affiliations isn’t just about which party or candidate someone votes for. It is a packaged identity. Being liberal isn’t just about voting for liberal candidates, it is also, to some degree, about living in urban areas, watching shows like Abbot Elementary, drinking Modelo Especial, and using Sunday mornings for things other than worship. Likewise, being conservative isn’t just about voting for conservative candidates, it is also, to some degree, about living in rural areas, watching shows like Yellowstone, drinking Busch Light, and going to church. More that that, being liberal is about thinking of yourselves as, at most, spiritual but not really religious; while being conservative is about think thinking of yourself as being Christian.
Third, and this is what Burge does write about, mainline congregations are “full of relatively well educated, middle class, rural old white people.” While Burge points out that this isn’t exactly the core of the Democratic Party right now, I think it’s also important to point out that this includes a lot of people who simply identify—in the sense of the packaged identities I mentioned above—as conservative and Republican. While I know this is anecdotal, even people in my own congregation who I know broadly support immigration, LGBTQ people, and public schools, also tend to have plenty of ‘reasonably’ caveats on that support. And even some people who I know voted for Biden in 2020 and Harris in 2024 continue to think of themselves as conservative and Republican.
If I’m right about the things that Burge didn’t write about—and I think that I am—then this all comes together to create a difficult situation for clergy who, like me, cannot see how someone could trust in the gospel and then vote for parties (and policies) that seem to oppose the values of that gospel. At best, our members are not well enough informed about policy to connect the values that we preach about—things like extravagant hospitality, abundant grace, welcoming refugees, caring for the marginalized, liberating the oppressed, and so on—to their voting preferences. At worst, those values are overwhelmed by the many other parts of our members’ identities that push them to vote for certain parties, candidates, and policies.
So what are my colleagues and I supposed to do with all of this? The truth is that, for the most part, I don’t know. In fact, the one thing that I do know is that we are called to love people regardless of where they are on the political spectrum. Sometimes, that means pushing back against some of the uglier aspects of people’s political identities; but, mostly, that means continuing to have patient conversations about the values that the gospel asks us to have and hope that those overflow into people’s political behavior.
But I also suspect a couple of things:
First, mainline clergy need to be much clearer about how the gospel connects to our political landscape. I know that most of us are taught to avoid partisanship in our ministries, many of us go beyond that and try to avoid anything even marginally political, and some of us even go so far as to say that our political views are personal and that we are not speaking as pastors when we make political statements. Some of that is good, but we also need to be much clearer about the stakes of our political action: one cannot be for Christ and for mass deportation, or for gutting assistance for the poor, or for cutting minority groups out of history, or for forcing people back into the closet, and so on. And no, there is no reasonable compromise on any of those things.
Second, mainline congregations need to be much more public about where they stand. I know that it is now obvious that not every mainline congregation is a liberal—let alone a progressive—congregation, but those who are need to put that on display. This is to show both the wider community and our own members that Christianity should not be coded as conservative. Christ does not align neatly with any candidate, the church should not fit neatly into any party, and people should know that the hope that they find in the gospel does not demand that they identify as liberal or conservative. Liberal and progressive congregations being public about where they stand can serve as an important corrective to the dominant narrative that Christianity is necessarily conservative.
Third, and finally, we all need to help each other ask where Christ is calling us to. As I wrote above, I don’t think that this aligns neatly with any political candidate, party, or ideology. But I do believe that Christ calls us to love, and having real conversations about what love looks like and how our voting patterns do—or do not—add real love to the world can help us abide more deeply in the God who is love, who came into the world in the person of Christ Jesus, and who welcomes us into abundant life in a reign of love.
If we do these things—and, I am certain, a substantial list of other things as well—we might be able to push back against a political takeover of the church and the reduction of Christianity to Trumpism, cross decals, and out-of-context Biblical quotations. Of course, it’s important to note that I don’t know if we will be successful, and it is possible that the institution of the church as we know it may have to die so that the church as the living body of Christ may continue in some other form.
